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“Six Floors” of
Detainee Operations
in the Post-9/11 World
THOMAS E. AYRES

“All you need to know is that there was a before 9/11 and an after 9/11.
After 9/11 the gloves came off.”
1
— Cofer Black, CIA

B

efore 9/11, many nations battled terrorists and mufti-clad insurgents in
places like Ireland, Israel, and Algeria and subsequently detained these
nontraditional combatants. These nations deliberated the applicability and
relevance of the Geneva Conventions2 and frequently decided to conduct
their detainee and interrogation operations by other standards.3 The United
States had faced similarly ambiguous combatants in past conflicts, choosing
“to extend basic prisoner of war protections to such persons . . . based upon
strong policy considerations, and . . . not necessarily based on any conclusion
that the United States was obligated to do so as a matter of law.”4 After 9/11,
however, the United States ceased viewing its efforts against terrorism as a
police enforcement action and embarked upon a Global War on Terrorism.5
The Bush Administration asserted this was “a new kind of war” that justified
reconsidering the manner in which the Laws of War would be interpreted and
applied.6 According to Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, “The reality is,
the set of facts that exist today with al Qaeda and the Taliban were not necessarily the set of facts that were considered when the Geneva Conventions
were fashioned.”7 Certain provisions of the Geneva Conventions were even
considered “quaint.”8 The United States has, by its post-9/11 policies and actions, demonstrated that the standards for conducting detainee operations,
and perhaps the Geneva Conventions themselves, are ripe for reform.
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The war on terror is in its fourth year, yet there has been little academic or political agreement on what detention and interrogation techniques
are ethically advisable and legally allowed. US detainee operations in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Guantanamo have been labeled a “gray zone” by one analyst.9
US classification of detainees in Afghanistan and Guantanamo Bay as “unlawful combatants” has aroused voluminous and vociferous academic debate,10
complicated because there are no internationally accepted, clearly delineated
detention and interrogation standards for treating “unlawful combatants.”
Even in Iraq, where the Administration conceded the Geneva Conventions applied, the overall post-9/11 paradigm shift prompted the Army’s command to
conduct a deliberative analysis of acceptable interrogation and detention techniques.11 The Department of Defense is currently undergoing a more comprehensive formal initiative, with the Army acting as the lead agent.12
To describe the complexity of conducting modern military operations in an urban environment, US Marine Corps General Charles C. Krulak
used the metaphor of a “three-block war,”13 an environment wherein soldiers
or marines simultaneously fight a high-intensity conflict in one block, suppress a simmering insurgency in another block, and facilitate humanitarian
aid in a contiguous third block. Military forces conducting operations must
anticipate encountering an array of friendly, hostile, and neutral persons
within the three blocks. Detainees from these three blocks may be interrogated for strategic, operational, or tactical reasons.
Just as recognizing the nature of the “three-block war” enables
commanders to conduct successful operations in that environment, clarifying lines of demarcation within the new gray zone of detainee operations is
essential. Delineating the categories of potential detainees is the starting
point. Determining the limits on interrogations and other legal responsibilities for each category of detainees is the logical next step. The Geneva Conventions provide the basis for considering different categories of detainees;
they also provide the legal, ethical, and moral framework for differentiating
treatment among the categories. Publishing a post-9/11 framework and
clearly communicating that the United States faithfully adheres to a wellenunciated and reasoned, if new, standard can substantially support US policy and strategy.
Lieutenant Colonel Thomas E. Ayres is a member of the Judge Advocate General’s
(JAG) Corps and currently serves as Deputy Legal Counsel to the Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff. He is a graduate of the US Military Academy, the University of Pennsylvania’s School of Law, and the US Army War College. Lieutenant Colonel Ayres served
as the Staff Judge Advocate for the 82d Airborne Division in both Operations Enduring
Freedom and Iraqi Freedom.
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The Bush Administration’s strict legal analysis and categorization
of detainees in the Global War on Terrorism offers a useful starting point for
considering the levels of protection currently afforded by the Geneva Conventions. Before developing guidance on allowable interrogation techniques,
the Administration sought to distinguish these detainees as something other
than POWs as defined by Geneva III.14 The war on terror was a global war
with a new kind of enemy.15 The Administration considered Geneva’s categories of protected persons, protected places, and occupiers’ obligations,
and assessed that strict adherence would result in unnecessary and counterproductive legal, procedural, and monetary obligations.
As an angry nation reeled from the 9/11 attack, the Bush Administration made an initial determination against granting POW status to Taliban and
al Qaeda members detained in Afghanistan. On 19 January 2002, Secretary
Rumsfeld transmitted a directive to the Combatant Commanders that captured
members of the Taliban and al Qaeda were to be treated humanely. He added,
however, that they “are not entitled to prisoner of war status for purposes of the
Geneva Conventions of 1949.”16 On 28 January 2002, President Bush stated
that he had met with his national security team and decided the detainees were
illegal combatants and would “not be treated as prisoners of war.”17
This position confirmed the predilection to avoid being bound by the
constraints of the Geneva Conventions in this war with a new kind of enemy. On
7 February 2002, the President published a memorandum specifying the results
of his Administration’s legal analysis.18 The analysis determined that the US action in Afghanistan met the criteria for an international conflict, but that captured
Taliban would not be considered POWs because they did not meet the international standards for lawful combatants. The Administration also decided not to
classify al Qaeda detainees as POWs because al Qaeda was not a state or a party
to the Conventions, nor did their members meet the criteria for lawful combatants. The memo concluded that considering “our values as a nation . . . as a matter
of policy, the United States Armed Forces shall continue to treat detainees humanely and, to the extent appropriate and consistent with military necessity, in a
manner consistent with the principles of Geneva.”19 The President’s memorandum made no mention of the Administration’s position with respect to adherence to the Convention Against Torture,20 perhaps never anticipating that the US
position and values regarding that convention would be brought into question.
The Administration did not similarly articulate its position on the legal
status of the forces faced in Iraq, even well into the conduct of Operation Iraqi
Freedom. During the high-intensity phase of the conflict, US forces not only
faced and captured numerous uniformed combatants they rightly treated as
POWs, they also encountered forces they claimed functioned as unlawful combatants.21 Since then, coalition forces have continuously engaged an array of inAutumn 2005
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surgents and foreign fighters, such as Zarqawi’s “al Qaeda in Iraq,” whose status
under the Geneva Conventions is, at best, problematic. Yet the Administration’s
published status determination for detainees in Afghanistan and Guantanamo
has not been replicated for the conflict in Iraq. Following the Abu Ghraib scandal, the Administration stated, “The President made no formal declaration with
respect to our conflict in Iraq because it was automatic that Geneva would apply. . . . The war in Iraq is covered by the Geneva Conventions, so our policies
there must meet those standards, in addition to the torture convention.”22 However, when an official spokesperson was directly asked about Zarqawi’s status in
Iraq, he could respond only that it was a “very interesting question.”23
The Administration’s approach to detention operations in Afghanistan and Guantanamo and its slowness in addressing the issue in Iraq indicate
its unwillingness to apply Geneva III’s guidance to handling Global War on
Terrorism detainees. Even so, the Administration declares the underlying position that the “United States is treating and will continue to treat all of the individuals . . . humanely and to the extent appropriate and consistent with
military necessity, in a manner consistent with the principles of the Third
Geneva Convention of 1949.”24 However, the detainees in Afghanistan and
Guantanamo “will not receive some of the specific privileges afforded to
POWs, including: access to a canteen . . . a monthly advance of pay . . . the
ability to receive scientific equipment, musical instruments, or sports outfits.”25 The Administration asserts that severe security risks preclude affording all of the privileges allowed by Geneva III.
Significantly, the Administration appeared determined not to apply
the Geneva Conventions to the Taliban and al Qaeda in order to preserve US
options and flexibility in dealing with the detainees. Captured terrorists and
their sponsors likely possess information which could prevent “further atrocities against American civilians,” but Geneva III’s strict guidance with respect to treatment of POWs does not facilitate attempts to obtain that
knowledge or information.26 US officials further recognized that granting
POW status to Taliban and al Qaeda members would put US interrogation
agents at risk of prosecution, because any “outrages against personal dignity,” as prohibited by common Article 3 of the Conventions, could be domestically prosecuted as a war crime.27 There was also an explicit recognition
that designation of Taliban and al Qaeda as POWs would greatly restrict options with respect to their ultimate disposition.28 By law and custom, POWs
are normally repatriated and released from confinement at the cessation of
hostilities. However, US officials acted under the presumption that the ideological terrorists at issue must not be subject to release on those terms; rather,
they should be subject to incarceration indefinitely or for a term of years determined by a trial for their crimes. By not designating Taliban and al Qaeda
36
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detainees as POWs, the Administration retained several means whereby they
could ultimately be incarcerated and tried—such as military tribunals, domestic criminal courts, international war crimes tribunals, even as POWs at
court-martial. Indeed, the status determination arguably provides the framework by which terrorists could be turned over, extradited, or “rendered” to
foreign nations that might not be as punctilious and restrained with respect to
the Convention Against Torture. In the final analysis, the Administration has
sought to keep its options open, refusing to be bound by the confines of strict
adherence to Geneva or the traditional criminal approach.29

Pre-9/11 US Army Detention and Interrogation Doctrine
There are four criteria by which nonuniformed combatants may obtain status as POWs under Geneva III, the Convention on Prisoners of War.30
These combatants must fight in distinguishable clothing or wear a distinctive
insignia recognizable at a distance, carry their arms openly, act under the leadership of responsible command, and conduct their operations in accordance
with the laws of war.31 In past conflicts in Vietnam, Panama, Somalia, Haiti,
and Bosnia, the United States often faced an enemy that did not meet these criteria. Nonetheless, US doctrine broadly required strict conformance with
Geneva rules. Thus the recent “unlawful combatant” determination made previous doctrinal guidance, if not irrelevant, certainly subject to reinterpretation.
The Army is the Defense Department’s executive agent for the conduct of detention operations, and since World War II the Army’s guidance for
regulating detention operations has strictly observed the Geneva Conventions.32 The Army’s overall guidance for detention operations is found in Army
Regulation 190-8; it “implements international law, both customary and codified,” relating to “Enemy Prisoners of War (EPWs), Retained Personnel, Civilian Internees, and Other Detainees.”33 The regulation recognizes shades of
enemy compliance with Geneva by providing for Article 5 tribunals to determine questionable status; it offers no practical guidance on the outcome of that
status determination. Doctrine therefore provides that all combatants, lawful
or unlawful, are to be treated as POWs, and provides no guidance if another status is determined. The Army’s “doctrinal guidance, techniques, and procedures governing employment of interrogators” are set forth in Field Manual
34-52, Intelligence Interrogation.34 This doctrine applies “to operations in
low-, mid-, and high-intensity conflicts.”35 Further, it anticipates provision of
interrogator support for the full range of nuanced low-intensity conflicts:
insurgency and counterinsurgency environments, peacekeeping contingency
operations, and, notably, “combating terrorism.”36 The doctrine also recognizes that not all interrogations can be conducted by trained interrogators;
accordingly, it mandates that at the tactical level, when trained interrogator
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“At the strategic level, the United States should
lead serious international initiatives to
update and revise the Geneva Conventions.”

support is unavailable, units should include “provisions and standing operating procedures (SOPs) for the ‘tactical questioning’ (not interrogation) of
EPWs or detainees.”37
Both the regulation and the manual assumed that the protections and
limitations of the Geneva Conventions would apply to all aspects of detention
and interrogation operations. The interrogation manual clearly stipulates that
the “stated policy of the US Army [is] that military operations will be conducted in accordance with the law of war obligations of the US.”38 The manual further provides the general guidance that all persons shall be afforded the
full protections and status of an EPW when there is a question as to their true
status, but gives no guidance on the practical effect of an other-than-POW status determination by an Article 5 tribunal. The manual notes incongruously
that in low-intensity conflicts it is important to differentiate between EPWs
and criminals, but provides no substantive guidance on whether to treat criminals differently.39 To heighten the incongruity, it qualifies that, as a matter of
policy, the procedures for interrogations and the cloak of Geneva protections
apply to an even broader spectrum of categories of personnel than merely
those who meet the criteria of protected persons under the Geneva Conventions. The manual then reiterates the general prohibition on the use of force
and the affirmative obligations of the Geneva Conventions even with respect
to the categories of: “Civilian internees, Insurgents, EPWs, Defectors, Refugees, Displaced persons, Agents or suspected agents [and], Other non-US
personnel.”40 Clearly then, pre-9/11 Army doctrine recognized that differentiation among categories of detainees was possible, but it straightforwardly
directed that those differentiations and lines of demarcation would not be
meaningfully recognized at the operational and tactical levels.
Some critics claim that the Bush Administration’s failure to categorize
Global War on Terrorism detainees as POWs has led to widespread abuses. Human Rights Watch, for example, claims the “pattern of abuse” at Abu Ghraib resulted from “decisions made by the Bush Administration to bend, ignore, or cast
rules aside.”41 The Administration, on the other hand, “categorically reject[s]”
that the President’s determinations contributed to the abuses at Abu Ghraib.42
Investigating officers have found, however, that there was a causal connection,
38
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noting that some of the nonviolent abuses of detainees in Iraq resulted from the
failure to ensure uniform understanding of detention and interrogation guidance
in-theater.43 The Commander-in-Chief’s specific finding that detainees in the
Global War on Terrorism were to be classified as “unlawful combatants” had
both intended and unintended effects. The determination carried significant legal consequences about how the military could conduct its detainee operations
and with what vigor those detainees could be interrogated in Afghanistan and
Guantanamo. There were larger practical consequences as well.

The Case for Categorizing Detainees Separately
The current confusing state of affairs can be substantially improved
by clarifying categories of detainees and improving guidance to those conducting detainee and interrogation operations in the post-9/11 environment.
There are also significant legal and ethical reasons to provide such guidance
as the military revises its regulations and guidance to recognize post-9/11 realities. At the strategic level, the United States should lead serious international initiatives to update and revise the Geneva Conventions with respect to
the treatment of detained persons to recognize the realities of the widespread
adoption of terrorist tactics and the realities of modern terrorist operations.
The revised Conventions should provide strong disincentives for such behavior. Additionally, in view of the lengthy process of acquiring the international
consensus to update the Third and Fourth Geneva Conventions, the current
Conventions should not be abandoned simply because they cannot be applied
neatly to the realities of our era. They can facilitate a clearer delineation of
categories of detainees, and they suggest allowable differences in treatment
to provide incentives for lawful combat and to deter unlawful forms of combat. Finally, the US military should provide specific and unequivocal guidance to forces at the operational and tactical levels on the gradations of
treatment and levels of protection applicable to six specific categories or
“floors” of detainees, as shown in Figure 1, on the following page.
Fighting three-block wars throughout the post-9/11 world, US forces
will detain individuals who should be categorized in one of the six floors of detainees shown in the figure. Once their status has been determined, their baseline legal protections or safeguards will also be assured.
On the top floor are easily identifiable enemy prisoners of war.
POWs openly wear the uniform of a power that abides by the laws of war, and
are accorded all privileges specified in Geneva III.44 On the fifth floor reside
lawful insurgents—combatants who meet the Geneva criteria of openly bearing arms, who wear a distinctive insignia or marking, who abide by the laws
of war, and who are organized under responsible leadership. On the fourth
floor are those less well-organized insurgents who may not have the ability,
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POWs

Lawful Insurgents

Protocol I Insurgents

Unlawful Combatants

Figure 1.
The “Six Floors”
of Detainees.

Terrorists
Noncombatants
(Civilians on the battlefield
or occupied territory)

support, desire, or organization to wear distinctive insignia, but who meet the
other three Geneva criteria and therefore meet the criteria of Protocol I to
Geneva III (to which the United States is not bound). On the third floor reside
unlawful combatants under Geneva III originally called saboteurs and spies;
they act as insurgents and seek to conduct warfare against military targets
without regard to the Geneva criteria for lawful combatants. On the second
floor are “terrorists”; they meet the criteria of illegal combatants but additionally wage campaigns mostly against civilian rather than military targets with
the intent to kill civilians as a means of spreading fear and intimidation
throughout the civilian population. Finally, on the ground floor are a variety
of noncombatants, including those suspected of assisting or encouraging
those on the upper floors, those having knowledge about the whereabouts and
methods of the members of the upper floors, those whose status or leanings
are unknown, and truly innocent civilians.
The Top Floor: POWs
There seems little need, justification, or inclination to change the
status or protections of POWs. POWs deservedly have the greatest level of
protections and benefits. By design, Geneva III provides an incentive for
nation-states or other international actors to wage war by means of uniformed
armies. In providing this incentive, Geneva III attempts, as far as possible, to
40
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shield civilians from the ravages of war. Uniformed soldiers facing each
other in a “clean” war target each other based solely on their identifiable status, so they need not wait for their opponent’s demonstration of hostile intent.
In so doing, they restrict their targets to the opposing uniformed forces and
lessen the chances of collateral civilian injury. Uniformed soldiers also are
provided immunity from prosecution for their lawful wartime efforts; they
are granted the elevated “protected person” status when they surrender or are
rendered unfit for further combat (hors de combat).45 Upon capture, they are
entitled to a full array of privileges and benefits as POWs. Perhaps most important, the limitation upon the extent and vigor of interrogations of POWs is
sacrosanct:
Every prisoner of war, when questioned on the subject, is bound to give only his
surname, first names and rank, date of birth, and army, regimental, personal or
serial number, or failing this, equivalent information. . . . No physical or mental
torture, nor any other form of coercion, may be inflicted on prisoners of war to
secure from them information of any kind whatsoever. Prisoners of war who refuse to answer may not be threatened, insulted, or exposed to unpleasant or disadvantageous treatment of any kind.46

Such absolute protection is both justified and appropriate. Simply
by wearing the uniform and usual insignia, warring soldiers are exposed to incredible hazards. And their uniform answers the first question facing interrogators: Is this captured person a combatant or an innocent civilian? Civilized
society should promote this kind of clarity when it is compelled to resort to
warfare. Geneva III attempts to promote such behavior and thereby limit the
brutality of war.
The Fifth Floor: Lawful Insurgents
Similarly, Geneva III provides clearly detailed guidance and incentive for insurgents to wage their warfare in an open, distinguishable manner.
The rationale is clear: The Conventions recognize that not all warfare will be
conducted by uniformed armies and that civilians will sometimes feel compelled to war against a state (as in the American Revolution in the 18th century or the French Resistance in World War II). But, as far as possible, those
former civilians should conduct themselves like uniformed armies. If these
combatants conduct themselves according to the rules laid out in Geneva III,
then innocent bystander civilians will be at less risk of being injured collaterally. Specifically, Geneva III provides POW status and protections to:
Members of other militias and members of other volunteer corps, including
those of organized resistance movements belonging to a Party to the conflict and
operating in or outside their own territory, even if this territory is occupied, pro-

Autumn 2005

41

vided that such militias or volunteer corps, including such organized resistance
movements, fulfill the following conditions: (a) that of being commanded by a
person responsible for his subordinates; (b) that of having a fixed distinctive sign
recognizable at a distance; (c) that of carrying arms openly; (d) that of conducting their operations in accordance with the laws and customs of war.47

By specifying such conditions, the Convention seeks to promote or
modify behavior. These soldiers are encouraged to observe the rules through
the promise that, if they are captured, they will be treated as a warrior rather
than as a spy.
Therefore, the Convention provides an incentive to combatants to
conduct themselves in a certain way. It urges them to set themselves apart
from the civilian population by wearing distinctive insignia and carrying
their arms openly. The Convention then rewards that behavior with the
POW’s status and privileges if captured. Such recognition and reward is justified and should be continued.
The Fourth Floor: Protocol I Insurgents
While the United States has not signed the 1977 Protocol Additional
to the Geneva Conventions,48 a slight gradation exists internationally between insurgents who meet “Fifth Floor” criteria and those who do not. The
United States tends to view Protocol I insurgents as nearly synonymous with
unlawful combatants. The Truman Administration’s note forwarding Protocol I to the Senate is particularly instructive:
Protocol I . . . would grant combatant status to irregular forces even if they do
not satisfy the traditional requirements to distinguish themselves from the civilian population and otherwise comply with the laws of war. This would endanger civilians among whom terrorists and other irregulars attempt to conceal
themselves. These problems are so fundamental in character that they cannot
be remedied through reservations.49

For those countries that recognize it, Protocol I does in fact grant
POW status to any combatant who carries his arms openly during actual engagements and just prior to an armed attack. It completely excuses such combatants from observing any of the other three criteria in Article 4 of Geneva
III.50 Whether the United States should provide incentive to combatants
merely to carry their arms openly, and then only some of the time, is problematic. Since many of the United States’ closest allies have ratified Protocol I,
however, the United States must recognize and straightforwardly address this
reality as it conducts coalition detainee operations.51
As a matter of principle and policy, the United States at times categorizes and treats Protocol I insurgents as unlawful combatants. They do noth42
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ing to distinguish themselves from the population at large and nothing to
protect civilians from the general harms of warfare. As will be discussed
more fully below, the international community should not provide an incentive to such conduct by providing the full panoply of POW privileges and
protections for such behavior.
The Third Floor: Unlawful Combatants
The concept for identifying a category of unlawful combatants has
been recognized for decades; what has not been agreed upon is the standard for
treatment of such persons. Combatants who do not meet the criteria of POWs,
militia as defined by Article 4, or Protocol I combatants, as discussed above,
have been given several identifiers: “unprivileged belligerents,”52 “unprivileged combatants,”53 “extra-conventional persons,”54 “spies, guerillas, and
saboteurs.”55 The United States currently designates them as “unlawful combatants.”56 As early as the US Civil War, the Lieber Code, published in 1863 as
the Union Army’s General Order No. 100, recognized such distinctions. The
Lieber Code included instruction on the labeling and treatment of “armed
prowlers” (nonuniformed saboteurs), “war-rebels” (nonuniformed partisans in
occupied territory), and spies (nonuniformed intelligence gatherers). It authorized that all of them could suffer death as the equivalent of spies.57
This reasoning continued through modern times, and such distinctions are evident in the Geneva Conventions of 1949. As noted by Geneva
III’s most respected contemporary analyst Jean Pictet, the drafters understood that those who failed to abide by the criteria for lawful combat did so “at
their peril.”58 Even more recently, but before the current debate, the seminal
work on the status and privileges of unlawful combatants similarly concluded
that few guarantees of protection had been purposefully afforded to unlawful
combatants:
The correct legal formulation is, it is submitted, that armed and unarmed hostilities, wherever occurring, committed by persons other than those entitled to be
treated as prisoners of war or peaceful civilians merely deprive such individuals of a protection they might otherwise enjoy under international law and place
them virtually at the power of the enemy. . . . International law deliberately neglects to protect unprivileged belligerents because of the danger their acts present to their opponents.59

While the current debate generally recognizes a category that can be
called “unlawful combatants” or by some similar term, it also assumes that the
Conventions provide little to no guidance on how these unlawful combatants
should be treated while detained. Perhaps in anticipation and recognition of the
paucity of international guidance, the international community concurred to a
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baseline standard against torture in 1994 by means of the Convention Against
Torture. This treaty applies not only to repressive regimes’ treatment of their
own subjects, but also to detention of all lawful and unlawful combatants either
in internal or international armed conflicts.
It was into the black hole of international agreement that Secretary
Rumsfeld boldly strode when he authorized interrogation measures less extreme than those that would violate the Convention Against Torture, and yet
more stringent than those by which POWs may be questioned under Geneva
III. Criticism immediately ensued, while others jumped to the Administration’s defense.60 The tales of such treatment came to be called “stress and
duress tactics” by the press, although the Secretary of Defense’s explicit
guidance on detention and interrogation methods remained classified.61 Some
relevant documents have now been declassified, however. It is now known
that the Administration’s so-called “stress and duress tactics” authorized several controversial interrogation techniques, but were limited to the following:
Category I techniques . . .
(1) Yelling at the detainee (not directly in his ear or to the level that it would
cause physical pain or hearing problems).
(2) Techniques of deception: (a) Multiple interrogator techniques. (b) Interrogator identity. The interviewer may identify himself as a citizen of a foreign nation or as an interrogator from a country with a reputation for harsh treatment of
detainees.
Category II techniques . . .
(1) The use of stress positions (like standing) for a maximum of four hours.
(2) The use of falsified documents or reports.
(3) Use of the isolation facility for up to 30 days . . . .
(4) Interrogating the detainee in an environment other than the standard interrogation booth.
(5) Deprivation of light and auditory stimuli.
(6) The detainee may have a hood placed over his head . . . .
(7) The use of 20-hour interrogations.
(8) Removal of all comfort items (including religious items).
(9) Switching the detainee from hot rations to MREs.
(10) Removal of clothing.
(11) Forced grooming (shaving of facial hair, etc.).
(12) Using detainees’ individual phobias . . . to induce stress.62

These techniques were approved by the Secretary of Defense for use
on a limited, case-by-case basis and only with the approval of appropriate officials. The Secretary did not approve, “as a matter of policy,” the use of what
44
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was designated “Category III techniques.” Category III techniques can be described generally as the “use of mild non-injurious physical contact such as
grabbing, poking in the chest with the finger, and light pushing.”63 Such physical contact was prohibited.
The controversy over the designation of Taliban and al Qaeda prisoners as “unlawful combatants” seems to have subsided; however, the debate
around the morality and effectiveness of the detention and interrogation tactics
cited above continues. Indeed, after The Washington Post reported on the Pentagon’s “stress and duress” tactics, Human Rights Watch began to bring international pressure to bear against the United States to denounce these tactics.64
Declassifying the “stress and duress” measures, despite their relative difference from conventional notions of torture, has not stemmed the controversy.
Beyond the controversy is the fact that the Administration’s current
standards for interrogations tend to be counterproductive: They simply do not
appear to yield sufficient information to warrant the domestic and international
censure they generate. The conventional rationale for the current Category I
and II interrogation techniques is that interrogators are able to obtain valuable
information by exceeding the standards of Article 17 of Geneva III (stipulating
that POWs will not be threatened, insulted, or exposed to any unpleasant or disadvantageous treatment of any kind), while not rising to the level of the stated
White House position or the Convention Against Torture (“detainees will not
be subjected to physical or mental abuse or cruel treatment”).65
Advocates of the current techniques contend that in at least one case
in which such additional techniques were applied, valuable information was
gained.66 They do not, however, state whether the information gained was a
direct result of additional techniques or would have been gained in any event
under compliance with Article 17. Further, there is no contention that the additional techniques succeeded beyond the one example cited.
It seems the United States has gained little information or intelligence by exceeding measures authorized by Article 17, yet the nation has lost
international esteem by advertising its noncompliance with Geneva III. Even
so, some aver that unlawful combatants will “crack” and divulge information
if they are confronted with threats, insults, and unpleasant treatment not
amounting to torture. This conclusion is unlikely and potentially irrational:
The Defense Department readily acknowledges that many unlawful combatants have been trained in interrogation-resistance techniques, and the conclusion ignores widespread and typical experience.67 Both anecdotal evidence
and academic arguments indicate that stress and duress tactics, used sparingly by persons with extensive training and cultural understanding, can have
utilitarian value. But if such tactics are made available across the spectrum of
military operations, they can attract widespread scrutiny and criticism.
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“The concept for identifying a category of
unlawful combatants has been recognized for
decades; what has not been agreed upon is
the standard for treatment of such persons.”

In summary, unlawful combatants have long been recognized as a
category of combatants. There is no clear international standard on how they
should be treated in detention. The Bush Administration has designated that
Taliban and al Qaeda detainees are “unlawful combatants” and enunciated
clear standards on the how detainees in this category may be treated differently from POWs under Geneva. These new standards have been strongly
criticized, and the US military is currently reviewing them in order to update
operational doctrine and tactical guidance to incorporate them. However, US
military forces charged with implementing the standards would operate most
effectively by observing a standard that enjoyed international acceptance and
consensus, that added utilitarian value to interrogators’ goals, and that provided considerable disincentive to hostile forces to employ tactics and methods identifying them as unlawful combatants. The only reasonable hope of
providing such a standard is if the international community can agree to
guidelines under which unlawful combatants can be treated and interrogated.
Since such an agreement, or revision to Geneva III, is not likely in the near future, the US military should continue to categorize unlawful combatants only
in the environs of Afghanistan and Guantanamo Bay. Likewise, it must treat
unlawful combatants in those places precisely within the exact standards approved by Secretary Rumsfeld.
The Second Floor: Terrorists
Categorically distinguishing terrorists from unlawful combatants is
not generally accepted. The distinction rests upon the contention that terrorists differ markedly from unlawful combatants because their tactics are even
more heinous to civilization than are those of unlawful combatants generally.
When the Geneva Conventions were adopted there was little evidence or
practice to support this distinction. That is, terrorism is a recent phenomenon.
Unlawful combatants, though they fight unconventionally, observe the principle of war of identifying and distinguishing the object of their attacks and
then targeting their attacks on military objectives generally and civilians only
collaterally. Terrorists, on the other hand, select civilians as their primary tar46
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get and perpetrate violence and intimidation upon civilians in order to instill
widespread fear throughout the civilian population to influence civilian leadership to act according to their dictate or design. Unlike partisan warfare, this
terrorist tactic was not widespread prior to 1949. Although the “Geneva Conventions of 1949 are excellent instruments of humanitarian law, . . . they were
unfortunately backwards-looking to the experience of World War II.”68 Had
the current terrorist tactics been widespread before the consideration and
adoption of the Geneva rules, the drafters almost certainly would have attempted to provide a disincentive for adopting such a tactic to protect civilians from the ravages of combat, a persistent goal of the Conventions.
Even now, no international consensus or notable national authority
recognizes the distinction between unlawful combatants and terrorists. However, identification of persons as being in a category nearly as heinous as terrorists, and allowance for especially harsh treatment of them, was recognized
before the Middle Ages by the Romans as they fought what they termed
“latrunculi—robbers, pirates, brigands, outlaws, ‘the common enemies of
mankind.’”69 Even though such an argument has not been formally adopted in
modern times, as a practical matter several nations have identified terrorists as
a special case and have embarked upon determining that they should be treated
differently and more harshly. Such responses are potentially important because
international law is not only determined and codified by means of treaties, but
international law also values precedent by recognizing long-standing practices
and accepted conduct of nation-states. Therefore, it is particularly instructive
to consider specific case studies on how nations capturing and detaining terrorists treat them, either currently or in the recent past. Such evidence does not
provide authority for US military practitioners to treat them similarly, but it
does provide a useful starting point to consider how the international community might develop a standard by which a new category of “terrorists” might be
treated in the future.
Three case studies provide specific techniques of how terrorists are
presently treated more harshly. These involve activities in England and Israel, as well as an alleged US practice. England’s treatment of terrorists captured in Northern Ireland resulted in a case being heard at the European Court
of Human Rights.70 In that case, British authorities were found to have used
interrogation methods including hooding, wall-standing (a stress position),
subjection to noise, and deprivation of food, drink, and sleep. The European
Court of Human Rights found that this treatment violated the European Convention on Human Rights and was therefore inhumane, but did not constitute
torture. Similar techniques were used in Israel for a number of years: shaking,
stress positions, excessive tightening of handcuffs, and sleep deprivation.
The Supreme Court of Israel deemed that the techniques caused pain and sufAutumn 2005
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fering and were thus illegal.71 The Court did not, however, determine that the
techniques rose to the level of torture. Finally, it has been reported, but not
verified, that the United States has used the technique of “rendering” captured terrorists to third countries that do not strictly observe the laws of war
and may be using torture to elicit intelligence from rendered terrorists.72 Such
conduct would certainly violate Geneva rules if the combatants had been
granted the protections of POWs. Further, it would violate the Convention
Against Torture even if the rendered prisoners were not granted the status of
POWs. In all three cases, nations have apparently determined, at least temporarily, that terrorists’ protections and privileges fall below those afforded
POWs, lawful combatants, and unlawful combatants. Yet these three nations
seem unwilling to cross the line of conducting torture themselves.
In summary, the category of terrorists is not legally or practically
recognized, so current detention operations should accord no “special treatment” for perceived terrorists. But consideration should be given to the effort
to determine whether terrorists should be less privileged than unlawful combatants. Of course, making fine distinctions about when inhumane treatment
or the infliction of minor pain and suffering fails to rise to the level of “torture” (physical or mental abuse) is far from easy, and very risky. Implementation of such policies necessarily relies upon the presumption that personnel
on the ground executing the policy can discern the differences between legal
and illegal techniques and inflict the degrees of treatment required in accord
with these very subjective terms. In reality, even persons of good faith could
argue over the effect of certain procedures and whether specific techniques
constitute merely “unpleasant or inhumane treatment” or rather “physical or
mental abuse.” Accordingly, US military practitioners in the field should
consider separate identification and categorization of terrorists but steer well
clear of embarking upon treating terrorists other than as authorized within the
determinations of treatment for unlawful combatants. Further, even if national recognition or international consensus regarding a different categorization and treatment of terrorists does eventually come to fruition, the best
course for military authorities would be to leave interrogations of those who
are categorized as terrorists to civilian agencies, such as the Central Intelligence Agency, whose agents should have greater experience and more specific, nuanced, and detailed training in dealing with such detainees. But those
agents also are bound by the Convention Against Torture, which the United
States has signed and ratified.
The Ground Floor: Noncombatants
Geneva allows temporary internment of civilians to maintain operational security or the security of the civilians themselves.73 Accordingly, mili48
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tary forces the world over routinely temporarily detain and question civilians
present on the battlefield. Such practice is commonplace because it recognizes that those civilians on the battlefield are at once both a potential source
of valuable intelligence, as “the sea in which the partisan fish swim,” and, if
nonuniformed combatants, then partisan fish themselves. Army Field Manual 34-52 describes the latter half of the problem succinctly: “Failure of the
enemy to wear a uniform results in an identification problem. As a result,
large numbers of civilian suspects may also be detained during operations.”74
Questioning of civilians is routine; it is normally conducted by rank-and-file
soldiers walking the ground, rather than by trained interrogators. So the
protections and privileges granted noncombatants should be widely understood and thoroughly trained throughout the force.
Noncombatants are entitled to numerous protections, and their treatment is accordingly a sensitive issue. Geneva grants noncombatants the status
of “Protected Persons” and gives them the protections of Common Article 3 (so
named because it appears identically in all four Geneva Conventions). Common Article 3 prohibits acts of violence, cruel treatment, and torture against
noncombatants “at any time and in any place whatsoever”; it also prohibits
“outrages upon personal dignity; in particular, humiliating and degrading treatment.”75 Noncombatants, of course, are also protected by the Convention
Against Torture. When doubt arises as to whether an apparent noncombatant
civilian may have committed a belligerent act, Geneva III, Article 5, dictates
that a tribunal should be convened to determine his status. The United States
has been recently criticized for not sufficiently adhering to this provision. The
Committee on International Human Rights of the Bar Association of the City
of New York reported: “The US should adhere to Geneva III’s requirement that
any detainee whose POW status is in ‘doubt’ is entitled to POW status—and,
therefore, cannot be subjected to coercive treatment—until a ‘competent tribunal,’ which must be convened promptly, determines otherwise.”76
Additionally, civilians who are interned by a nation-state that is also
an “occupying power” are granted greater and more specific privileges and
protections than noncombatants generally. Geneva IV recognizes that civilians can be interned by an occupying power for any number of reasons, but
dictates that civilians “shall retain their full civil capacity” and grants them
even greater rights in some aspects than are granted POWs.77 For instance, interned civilians must be housed separately from POWs, and the occupying
power is charged with providing for the well-being of their dependents, so it
must provide for the family members of the interned civilians.78
The US military’s treatment of civilians suspected of being unlawful
combatants or terrorists in Afghanistan or insurgents in Iraq is bound by the
treaties mentioned above. If these detainees are not treated accordingly, their
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detention can produce harmful second-order effects. Arguably, application of
the Category I and II measures means that every suspect, even an innocent villager rounded up in a search and sweep for terrorists, who in fact turns out to not
be a terrorist, could be exposed to yelling, deception, and generally unpleasant
treatment. The United States maintains that the military has sorted out “more
than 10,000 suspects in Afghanistan and reduced their number to a select few
who would make their way to Guantanamo.”79 If the Category I and II methods
are not restricted to those who have been clearly and properly identified as unlawful combatants, then the unpleasant treatment could have a negative galvanizing effect as suspected detainees are released back to their communities.
Consequently US forces should rigorously adhere to the standards enunciated
for noncombatants. They should routinely conduct Article 5 tribunals so they
are certain of their determinations of combatants of any kind.

Conclusion
In the aftermath of 9/11, some have called for a “ruthless, ‘gloves-off’
response that would sweep aside legal and political obstacles.”80 Yet the American public’s response to the Abu Ghraib abuses provides strong evidence that
such an approach is still inconsistent with America’s values.
In the post-9/11 environment, US forces can expect to encounter six
different types and categories of potential detainees, and they should be given
clear guidance on how those detainees should be treated. They should fully
comprehend the six categories and be fully cognizant of the boundaries of
treatment for each category as it is currently codified and promulgated. And
they must continue to abide by current restrictions until the debate leads to
changes of internationally accepted and agreed-upon standards.
There is good reason for the international community to agree upon
more understandable and more stringent measures against unlawful combatants and terrorists in order to deter hostile forces from adopting such tactics.
But we must not legitimize inhumane measures and debase ourselves by
adopting anything like the tactics of the common enemies of mankind.
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